A critical analysis of the leniency instrument: finding the right balance between efficiency and justice in EU competition law

Tine Carmeliet
Het opsporen van kartels tussen multinationals: efficiëntie ten koste van rechtvaardigheid? Samenvatting – Het verklikkersysteem dat de Europese Commissie gebruikt om kartels tussen ondernemingen op het spoor te komen, is vandaag even populair als controversieel. Enerzijds stelt het de Commissie in staat om in een korte tijdsspanne tegen lage administratieve kosten veel ondernemingen te beboeten. Anderzijds krijgt het systeem zeer veel kritiek omdat het de ondernemingen die in het kartel betrokken zijn, niet rechtvaardig behandelt.

A critical analysis of the leniency instrument: finding the right balance between efficiency and justice in EU competition law

Het opsporen van kartels tussen multinationals: efficiëntie ten koste van rechtvaardigheid?

Samenvatting – Het verklikkersysteem dat de Europese Commissie gebruikt om kartels tussen ondernemingen op het spoor te komen, is vandaag even populair als controversieel. Enerzijds stelt het de Commissie in staat om in een korte tijdsspanne tegen lage administratieve kosten veel ondernemingen te beboeten. Anderzijds krijgt het systeem zeer veel kritiek omdat het de ondernemingen die in het kartel betrokken zijn, niet rechtvaardig behandelt. Dit onderzoek gaat na wat de maatschappelijke implicaties van dergelijk verklikkersbeleid zijn en stelt verbeteringen voor om het systeem (meer) aanvaardbaar te maken.

Situering van het onderzoek – De Europese Unie (hierna “EU”) gaat er prat op één van de weinige regio’s in de wereld te zijn met een eengemaakte economische ruimte (zonder invoerheffingen). Om deze eengemaakte markt te garanderen, ontwierp de EU verschillende regels die voorkomen dat multinationals en kleinere bedrijven samenspannen in een kartel om zo de prijs van hun producten artificieel op te trekken. Een afspraak tussen Coca-Cola en Pepsi Cola om hun producten slechts vanaf een in samenspraak bepaalde (te hoge) prijs te verkopen is een typisch voorbeeld van een kartel. De Europese Commissie is belast met het opsporen en het beboeten van dergelijke kartels. Vermits kartels in alle geheim worden gesloten, is het zeer moeilijk om ze op het spoor te komen en hun bestaan te bewijzen. Om aan deze bewijsproblemen tegemoet te komen, heeft de Europese Commissie het ‘verklikkerssysteem’ gecreëerd. Dit systeem houdt in dat een onderneming die in het kartel betrokken is, van een boete vrijgesteld wordt op voorwaarde dat zij de andere ondernemingen in het kartel verklikt en het bestaan van het kartel bewijst.

Onderzoeksvraag – Dit verklikkersysteem, dat ondernemingen een clemente behandeling aanbiedt in ruil voor hun medewerking met het onderzoek van de Europese Commissie, is vandaag de dag het ultieme wapen in haar strijd tegen kartels. De praktijk leert dat de mogelijkheid om een boetevrijstelling te bekomen in ruil voor het verklikken van andere ondernemingen voor velen een zeer aantrekkelijke optie is. De angst dat een andere onderneming het kartel bij de Europese Commissie eerst verklikt, is zo groot dat vandaag meer dan de helft van alle bestrafte kartels aan het licht komen aan de hand van het  verklikkerssysteem. Het systeem is echter niet zonder controverse. Ten eerste is het zo dat de Europese Commissie de kartellisten bijzonder hoge boetes oplegt. Aangezien veel ondernemingen door deze hoge boetes failliet gaan, voelen ze zich verplicht om het kartel te verklikken en op die manier de boete te ontlopen. Ten tweede blijkt uit de praktijk dat de ondernemingen die anderen verklikken en bijgevolg aanspraak maken op een boetevrijstelling, door de Europese Commissie zeer onfair behandeld worden. Zo lijkt de Europese Commissie arbitrair te beslissen of ze al dan niet een boetevrijstelling toekent, ook al heeft de onderneming in principe recht op een clemente behandeling. In deze masterscriptie ben ik nagegaan, gelet op de voormelde negatieve gevolgen, in welke mate het verklikkerssysteem van de Europese Commissie wel een legitiem systeem is, en of er alternatieven bestaan die minder nadelen met zich meebrengen.

Onderzoeksrelevantie en methode – De wetenschappelijke relevantie van het onderzoek naar de legitimiteit van het verklikkerssysteem is bijzonder groot. Doordat het verklikkersmechanisme vandaag veelvuldig wordt toegepast, is het onderzoek in staat om oplossingen voor te stellen die een grote impact op de huidige  werking van het systeem kunnen hebben. Daarnaast kadert het onderzoek in het actuele debat rond mensenrechten voor ondernemingen. Doordat het verklikkerssysteem essentieel een praktijkgericht systeem is, werd gekozen om het onderzoek vanuit de praktijk te voeren. Zo werden in een empirische benadering zowel de Europese Commissie als verscheidene ondernemingen geïnterviewd omtrent de voordelen en knelpunten van het systeem. Dit uniek empirisch onderzoek werd door beiden partijen actief ondersteund. Vanuit hun bezwaren werd daarna nagegaan of het verklikkersysteem een rechtvaardig systeem is. Om het onderzoek neutraal te voeren, werden echter eerst verschillende wetenschappelijk onderbouwde criteria ontwikkeld, waaraan het verklikkersmechanisme getoetst werd.

Resultaat van het onderzoek – Het onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat het verklikkerssysteem van de Europese Commissie vandaag zeer efficiënt is. De verschillende aspecten van het systeem voldoen echter niet aan de vereisten van een rechtvaardig en redelijk afdwingingssysteem. Dit resultaat was verrassend, en is een primeur in de rechtswetenschappelijke literatuur: voor het eerst werd bewezen dat het systeem, dat reeds tientallen jaren in werking is, fundamenteel illegitiem is. Deze vaststelling heeft mij in tweede instantie ertoe geleid om af te vragen waar de balans ligt tussen een rechtvaardige en een efficiënte afdwinging van kartels. Vandaag lijkt er teveel nadruk te liggen op efficiëntie in plaats van op rechtvaardigheid. Nadat deze tekortkomingen werden vastgesteld, heb ik enkele voorstellen aan de Europese Commissie geformuleerd die haar in staat moet stellen haar verklikkerssysteem rechtvaardiger te maken.

Conclusie – Aan de hand van dit onderzoek konden we constateren dat een systeem, nooit eerder in vraag gesteld en vandaag veelvuldig gebruikt, fundamenteel onaanvaardbaar is. Het resultaat is daarom van essentieel belang: op een neutraal wetenschappelijke manier werd bewezen dat ondernemingen verplicht worden te participeren aan systeem dat niet rechtvaardig is. Een clemente behandeling, in het begin opgevat als een uitzonderlijk systeem, is vandaag meer regel dan uitzondering. Terwijl het systeem erop gericht is meer kartels te beboeten en de administratieve kosten van de Europese Commissie te verlagen, dient men zich af te vragen of het niet (teveel) ten koste van de rechtvaardigheid gaat. Het miskennen van procedurele rechten van de  ondernemingen verwaarloost de waarden van de EU, en knaagt aan haar legitimiteit. Deze masterthesis maakt bijgevolg pijnlijk duidelijk dat het hoogtijd is de fundamenten van het systeem te herbekijken en na te gaan welke waarden voor de Europese samenleving echt belang zijn: rechtvaardigheid gecombineerd met efficiëntie, of efficiëntie ten koste van rechtvaardigheid?

Bibliografie

Bibliography

I. Legislation and Legislative Instruments

  • Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases [1996] OJ C 207, 4-6;
  • Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and European Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43;
  • Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2002] OJ C 45;
  • Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ 4/1/2003;
  • Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C 101/43;
  • Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C 210;
  • Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/17;
  • Treaty on the European Union, OJ C 236;
  • Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326;
  • Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326.

 

 

 

 

II. Case law, Opinions and Decisions

 

A. Case Law of the ECJ and the EGC

 

European Court of Justice

 

  • ECJ, Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm [1969] ECR I;

 

  • ECJ, Case 7/72 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH. v Commission [1972] ECR 1281;

 

  • ECJ, Case 9/73 Schlüter [1973] ECR 1135;

 

  • ECJ, Case 43/75 Defrenne Mülder [1976] ECR 455;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753;

 

  • ECJ, Case 112/77 Töpfer v Commission  [1978] ECR 1019;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-215/78 to C-218/78 Fedetab [1980] ECR 3125;

 

  • ECJ, Case 98/79 Pecastaing [1980] ECR 691;

 

  • ECJ, Case 169/80 Administration des Douanes v Gondrand Frères [1981] ECR 1931;

 

  • ECJ, Case 7/82 GVL v Commission [1983] ECR 483;

 

  • ECJ, Case 66/82 Fromançais v Forma [1983] ECR 395;

 

  • ECJ, Case 106/83 Sermide [1984] ECR 4209;

 

  • ECJ, Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1984] ECR 2171;

 

  • ECJ, Case 70/83 Kloppenberg [1984] ECR 1075;

 

  • ECJ, Case 42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR I-2545;

 

  • ECJ, Case 143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1986] ECR I-431;

 

  • ECJ, Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339;

 

  • ECJ, Case 325/85 Ireland v Commission [1987] ECR 5041;

 

  • ECJ, Case 47/86 Roquette Frères v ONIC [1987] ECR 2889;

 

  • ECJ, Case 56/86 Société pour l’exportation des sucres [1987] ECR 1423;

 

  • ECJ, Case 281/84 Zuckerfabrik Bedburg v Council [1987] ECR 49;
  • ECJ, Case 120/86 Mülder [1988] ECR 2321;

 

  • ECJ, Case 170/86 Von Deetzen  [1988] ECR 2355;

 

  • ECJ, Case 92/87 Commission v France [1989] ECR 405;

 

  • ECJ, Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-358/88 Oberhausener Kraftfutterwerk Wilhelm Hopermann GmbH v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftlichte Marktordnung [1990] ECR I-1687;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-41/90 Höfner & Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-325/91 France v Commission Mülder [1993] ECR I-3283;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances and Others v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche [1995] ECR I-4013;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-7495 and C-129/05 Criminal Proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-6609;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten  [1996] ECR I-431;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-63/93 Duff v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-143/93 Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten BV v Inspecteur der invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1996] ECR I-431;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-4459;

 

  • ECJ Case C-177/96 Banque Indosuez and Others  [1997] ECR I-5659;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-177/96 Belgian State v Banque indosuez and European Community [1997] ECR I-5659;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-354/95 R v Minister For Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte National farmers’ Union [1997] ECR I-4559;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-7/95 John Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-9/97 and C-118/97 Jokela and Pitkäranta [1998] ECR I-6267;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-233/96 Kingdom of Denmark v Commission [1998] ECR I-5759;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-185/95 Baustahlegewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-199/92 Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-235/92 Montecatini v Commission [1999] ECR I-04539;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-298/98 Metsa-Serla (Finnboard) v Commission [2000] ECR I-10171;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-174/98 and C-189/89 Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-1;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-297/98 SCA Holding v Commission [2000] ECR I-10101;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-238/99, C-244/99, C-245/99, C-247/99, C-250-252/99 and C-254/99 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV, DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf Atochem SA, Degussa AG, Enichem SpA, Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG and Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-41/90 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-176/99 Arbed v Commission [2003] ECR I-10687;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-194/99 Thyssen Stahl [2003] ECR I-10821;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-487/01 and C-7/02 Gemeente Leusden [2004] ECR I-5337;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-65/02 and C-73/02 ThyssenKrupp Stainless v Commission [2005] ECR I-7663;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-189/02, C-202/02, C-205/02, C-208/02 and C-213/02 Dansk Rorindustri A/S v Commission [2005] ECR I-05425;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-105/04 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2006] ECR I-00003;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-113/04 Technische Unie v Commission [2006] ECR I-08831;

 

  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-295/04 and C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-238/05 Asnef v Equifax [2006] ECR I-11125;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-301/04 Commission v SGL Carbon AG [2006] ECR I-05915;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-397/03 Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients Ltd v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-266/06 Evonik Degussa v Commission [2008] ECR I-81;
  • ECJ, Joined Cases C-341/06 and C-342/06 Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others [2008] ECR I-04777;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-385/07 Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2009] ECR I-06155;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-308/07 Gorostiagoa Atxalandabaso [2009] ECR I-1059;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-04529;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-344/08 Rubach [2009] ECR I-7033;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-413/08 Lafarge v Commission  [2010] ECR I-05361;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže [2010] nyr;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-352/09 ThyssenKrupp Nirosta and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-02359;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-389/10 KME Germany And Others v Commission [2011] nyr,;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-386/10 Chalkor v Commission, nyr;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2011] ECR I-6297;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-516/11 Liften, Ascenseurs And Others v Commission [2011] nyr;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] nyr;

 

  • ECJ, Case C‑617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2012] nyr;

 

  • ECJ, Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie and Others, pending.

 

 

 

European General Court

 

  • CFI, Case T-148/73 Louwage v Commission [1974] ECR 81;

 

  • CFI, Case T-11/89 Shell v. Commission [1992] ECR II-757;

 

  • CFI, Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021;

 

  • CFI, Case T-43/92 Dunlop Slazengr v Commission [1994] ECR II-44;

 

  • CFI, Case T-150/89 Martinelli v Commission [1995] ECR II-1165;

 

  • CFI, Case T-535/93 F v Council [1995] ECR II-163;

 

  • CFI, Case T-49/95 Van Megen Sports Group v Commission [1996] ECR II-1799;

 

  • CFI, Case T-73/95 Estabelecimentos Isidoro M. Oliveira SA v Commission [1997] ECR II-381; 

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission [1997] ECR II-1739;

 

  • CFI, Case T-310/94 Gruber and Weber v Commission [1998] ECR II-1043;

 

  • CFI, Case T-311/94 BPB De Eendracht v Commission [1998] ECR II-1129;

 

  • CFI, Case T-347/94 Mayr-Melnhof Kartongesellschaft v Commission [1998] ECR II-1751;

 

  • CFI, Case T-337/94 Enso-Gutzien Oy v Commission [1998] ECR II-1571;

 

  • CFI, Case T-352/94 Mo Och Domsjö AB t Commission [1998] ECR II-1989;

 

  • CFI, Case T-83/96 Van der Wal v Commission [1998] ECR II-545;

 

  • CFI, Case T-308/94 Cascades v Commission [1998] ECR II-925;

 

  • CFI, Case T-338/94 Finnboard v Commission [1998] ECR II-1617;

 

  • CFI, Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Servces European Parliament  [1999] ECR II-4239;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-25/95 to T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission  [2000] ECR II-491;

 

  • CFI, Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707;

 

  • CFI, Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II-00729;

 

  • CFI, Case T-48/98 Acerinox [2001] ECR II-3859;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-47/98 Thyssen Krupp Stainless and Acciai Speciali Terni v Commission [2001] ECR II-3757;

 

  • CFI, Case T-21/99 Dansk Rorindustri v Commission [2002] ECR II-1681; 

 

  • CFI, Case T-23/99 LR AF1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275;

 

  • CFI, Case T-220/00 Cheil Jedang Corp. v Commission [2003] ECR II-2473;

 

  • CFI, Case T-213/00 CMA CGM SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-913;

 

  • CFI, Case T-230/00 Daesang en Sewon v Commission [2003] ECR II-2733;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01, Graphite Electrodes: Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. and others v. Commission [2004] nyr;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering Corp. and Others v. Commission [2004] ECR II-02501; 

 

  • CFI, Case T-28/09 Holcim v Commission [2005] ECR II-1357;

 

  • CFI, Case T-38/02 Danone v Commission [2005] ECR II-4407;

 

  • CFI, Case T-2/03 Verein für Konsumenteninformation [2005] ECR II-1121;

 

  • CFI, Case T-48/02 Brouwerij Haacht v Commission [2005] ECR II-5259;

 

  • CFI, Case T-279/02 Degussa v Commission [2006] ECR II-897;

 

  • CFI, Case T-322/01 Roquette Frères v Commission [2006] ECR II-3137;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich And Others v Commission [2006] ECR II-5169;

 

  • CFI, Case T-26/02 Daiichi Pharmaceutical v Commission [2006] ECR II-713;

 

  • CFI, Case T-15/02 BASF AG [2006] ECR II-497;

 

  • CFI, Case T-155/04 SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission  [2006] ECR II-4797;

 

  • CFI, Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II- 03601;

 

  • CFI, Case T-36/05 Coats Holding and J&P Coats v Commission [2007] ECR II-110;

 

  • CFI, Joined Cases T-109/02, T-188/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 Bolloré versus Commission [2007] ECR II-947;

 

  • CFI, Case T-474/04 Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v Commision [2007], nyr;

 

  • EGC, Joined Cases T-45/98 and T-47/98, Thyssen Krupp Stainless and Acciai speciali Terni v Commission [2009] ECR II-3757;

 

  • EGC, Case T-127/04 KME v Commission [2009] ECR II-1167;

 

  • EGC, Case T-13/03 Nintendo v Commission [2009] ECR II-975;

 

  • EGC, Case T-161/05 Hoechst v Commission [2009] ECR II-3555;
  • EGC, Case T-237/05 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission  [2010] ECR II-2245;

 

  • EGC, Case T-111/07 Agrofert v Commission [2010] ECR II-128;

 

  • EGC, Case T-18/05 Imi And Others v Commission [2010] ECR II-1769;

 

  • EGC, Case T-132/07 Fuji v Commission (Gas Insulated Switchgear) [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-299/08 Elf Aquitaine/Commission [2011] ECR 2011;

 

  • EGC, Case T-437/08 CDC [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-138/07 Schindler v Commission [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-186/06 Solvay v Commission [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-343/08 Arkema France v Commission [2011] ECR II-02287;

 

  • EGC, Case T-208/06 Quinn v Commission [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-534/11 Schenker v Commission [2011] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-33/05 Cetarsa v Commission [2011] ECR II-00012;

 

  • EGC, Case T-37/05 World Wide Tobacco Espana v Commission [2011] ECR II-00041;

 

  • EGC, Case T-344/08 EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg v Commission [2012] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-135/09 Nexans France SAS v Commission [2012] nyr;

 

  • EGC, Case T-380/08 Netherlands v Commission, pending;

 

  • EGC, Case T-185/12 Huk-Coburg v Commission, pending;

 

  • EGC, Case T-341/12 Evonik Degussa v Commission, pending.

 

 

 

B. Opinions of Advocate-Generals

 

 

  • Opinion A-G Ruiz-Jarabo, ECJ, Joined Cases C-204 and C-205, C-211 to C-219/00 P Aalborg A/S and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123;

 

  • Opinion of A-G Geelhoed, ECJ, Case C-301/04 Commission v SGL Carbon [2006] ECR I-05915;

 

  • Opinion of A-G Geelhoed, ECJ, C-411/04 Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission [2007] ECR I-00959;

 

  • Opinion A-G Kokott, ECJ, Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže [2010] nyr.;

 

  • Opinion of A-G Jäaskinen, ECJ, Case C-536/11 [2013] nyr.

 

 

 

C. Case Law of the ECtHR

 

 

  • Engels And Others v The Netherlands no. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72; 5370/72, ECHR, 1976-II;

 

  • CR v United Kingdom no. 335-C, ECHR, 1995-II;

 

  • Saunders v United Kingdom no.19187/91, ECHR, 1996-II;

 

  • Heaney and Mc Guinness v Ireland no. 34720/97, ECHR, 2000-II;

 

  •  J.B. v Switzerland no. 31827/96, ECHR, 2001-II;

 

  • Abu Bakah Jalloh v Germany no. 54810/00, ECHR, 2007-II;

 

  • Jussila v Finland no. 73053/01, ECHR, 2006-II;

 

  • Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, no. 43509/08, ECHR, 2011-II.

 

 

 

D. Commission Decisions

 

 

  • Belgian Wallpaper Commission Decision [1974] OJ L237/3;

 

  • GB-Inno-BM/Fedetab + IV/29.127 - Mestdagh- Huyghebaert/Fedetab Commission Decision 78/670/EEC [1978] OJ L 224, Case COMP IV/29.149;

 

  • National Panasonic Commission Decision 82/465/EEC [1982] OJ L354/28;

 

  • Italian Flat Glass Commission Decision 89/93/EEC [1988] OJ L 033, Case COMP IV/31. 906;

 

  • Film Purchases by German Television Stations Commission Decision 89/536/EEC [1989] OJ L284/3, Case COMP IV/31734;

 

  • UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange Commission Decision 92/157/EEC [1992] OJ L 068, Case COMP IV/31.370 and 31.446;

 

  • Cement Commission Decision 94/815/EC [1994] OJ L 343, Case COMP IV/33.126 and 33.322;

 

  • Greek Ferries Commission Decision C(1998) 3792 [1998] OJ L 109/24, Case COMP/V/34466;

 

  • Amino Acids Commission Decision 2001/418/EC [2000] OJ L 152/24, Case COMP/36.545/F3;

 

  • Vitamins Commission Decision 2003/2/EC [2001], Case COMP/E-1/37.512;

 

  • Citric Acid Commission Decision 2002/742/EC [2001] OJ L 239, Case COMP/E-1/36 604;

 

  • Sorbaten Commission Decision 462/EC [2001] OJ L 162, Case COMP/E-1/37.370;

 

  • Raw Tobacco Spain Commission Decision 2001/462/EC [2001] OJ L 102, Case COMP/C.38.238/B3;

 

  • Zinc Phosphates Commission Decision 2003/437/EC [2001] OJ L 153/1, Case COMP/E-1/37.027;  

 

  • Graphite Electrodes Commission Decision 2002/271/EC [2002], Case COMP/E-1/36.490;

 

  • Speciality Graphite Commission Decision COM C(2002)5083final [2002] Case COMP/E-2/37.667;

 

  • PO/Interbrew en Alken Maes Commission Decision 2003/569/EC [2003] Case COMP IV/37.614/F3;

 

  • Belgian Beer Market Commission Decision 2003/569/EC [2003] 0J L200/1, Case COMP IV/37.614/F3;

 

  • Methionine Commission Decision 2003/674/EC [2003] OJ L255/1, Case COMP C.37.519;

 

  • Seamless Steel Tubes Commission Decision 2003/382/EC [2003] OJ L140/1, Case COMP IV/E-1/35.860-B;

 

  • Omega-Nintendo Commission Decision 2003/675/EC [2003] OJ L 255, Case COMP/36.321;

 

  • Austrian Banks – Lombard Club Commission Decision 2004/138/EC [2004] OJ L 56/1, Case COMP/36.571/D-1;

 

  • MCAA Commission Decision C(2004)4876 [2004]  OJ C 282, Case COMP/E-1/37.773;

 

  • Association of Belgian Architects Commission Decision 2005/8/EC [2004] OJ L 4/10, Case COMP/38.549;

 

  • Cartonboard Commission Decision 94/601/EC [2004] OJ L243/1, Case COMP IV/C/33.833;

 

  • Carbonless Paper Commission Decision C(2010) 4160 [2004] OJ L115/1; Case COMP/36212;

 

  • Raw Tobacco Spain Commission Decision 2007/C 85/09 [2004] OJ L 102, Case COMP/C.38.238/B3;

 

  • Industrial Bags Commission Decision C(2005)4634 [2005] Case COMP/38354;

 

  • Organ Peroxides Commission Decision 2005/349/EC [2005] OJ L 110, Case COMP/E-2/37.857;

 

  • Rubber Chemicals Commission Decision [2005] OJ L 153, Case COMP/F/38.443;

 

  • Methacrylates Commission Decision C(2006) 2098 [2006] OJ L 322, Case COMP/F/38.645;

 

  • Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate Commission Decision C(2006) 1766 [2006] OJ L 353, Case COMP/F/38.620;

 

  • PO/Elevators and Escalators Commission Decision C (2007) 512 [2007] OJ 75/19, Case COMP/E-1/38.823;

 

  • Chloroprene Rubber Commission Decision C(2007) 5910 [2007] OJ C 251, Case COMP/38629;

 

  • Nederlandse Biermarkt Commission Decision C(2007)1697 [2007] OJ L 200, Case COMP/B-2/37.766;

 

  • Gas Insulated Switchgear Commission Decision 2008/C 5/07 [2008] OJ C 5/7, Case COMP/38.899;

 

  • Steel Beams Commission Decision 2008/C 235/04 [2008] OJ C 235/4, Case C(2006) 5342, Case COMP/38.899;

 

  • Candle Waxes Commission Decision [2008] OJ C 295, Case COMP/39181;

 

  • Heat Stabilizers Commission Decision C(2009)8682 [2009], Case COMP/38589;

 

  • International Removal Services Commission Decision [2009] OJ C 188, Case COMP 38.543;

 

  • Consumer Detergents Commission Decision C(2011) 2528 [2011] OJ C138, Case COMP/39579.

 

E. Others

 

 

 

  • Ambtsgericht Bonn, Case no. 51 GS 53/09, 18 January 2012;

 

 

 

  • EFTA Court, Case E-15/10 Action brought on 14 September 2010 by Posten Norge AS against the EFTA Surveillance Authority 2010/C 320/12 [2012];

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III. Legal Doctrine

 

 

A. Monographs and Contributions in Monographs

 

 

  • ALLENDESALAZAR, A. and MARTINEZ-LAGE, P., “Evidence Gathered through Leniency: From the Prisoner’s Dilemma to a Race to the Bottom”, in C.-D. EHJERMANN and M. MARQUIS (eds.) European Competition Law Annual 2009. The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, Oxford, Oxford and Portland Hart Publishing 2009, 565-579;

 

  • AMATO, G. and EHLERMANN, C.-D., EC Competition Law. A Critical Assessment, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2007, 836p.;

 

  • ANDERTON, A., Economics, Lancashire, Causeway Press, 2000, 762p.;

 

  • ANDREANGELI, A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009, 697p.;

 

  • BARR, N., Economics of the Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 386p.;

 

  • BERLAGE, L. and DECOSTER, A., Inleiding tot de Economie, Leuven, Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2011, 755p.;

 

  • BISHOP, S. and WALKER, M., The Economics of EC Competition Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, 966p.;

 

  • BLANCO, L.O., EC Competition Procedure, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 634p.;

 

  • BLOOM, M., “Despite its Great Success, the EC Leniency Program Faces Great Challenges” in C.-D. EHLERMANN and I. ATANASIU (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2006, 543-571;

 

  • BRAMMER, S., Cooperation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009, 548p.;

 

  • CRAIG, P., EU Administrative Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 777p.;

 

  • DE BURCA, G., “Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law”, in U. BERNITZ and J. NERGELIUS (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmö, 27-28 August 1999, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 93-119;

 

  • DEVROE, W. and DELATHAUWER, N., “Actualia Mededingingsrecht”, in X (ed.), Recht in beweging, Antwerp, Maklu, 2011, 151-178;

 

  • EIJSBOUTS, W.T., “In Defence of EC Law”, in T.A.J.A. VAN DAMME and J.H. REESMAN (eds.), Ambiguity in the Rule of Law, Groningen, Europe Law Publishing, 2001, 35-50;

 

  • EMBERLAND, M., The Human Rights of Companies. Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 239p.;

 

  • EMILIOU, N., The Principle of Proportionality in European Law - A Comparative Study, London, The Hague, Kluwer, 1996, 288p.;

 

  • EZRACHI, A., EU Competition Law. An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012, 545p.;

 

  • FAULL, J. and NIKPAY, A., The EC Law of Competition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 1844p.;

 

  • GLOVER, J., Humanity, A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, London, Pimlico, 2011, 466p.;

 

  • GOYDER, D.G., The future of European Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 697p.;

 

  • GROUSSOT, X., General Principles of Community Law, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2006, 480p.;

 

  • GUERSENT, O., “The Fight Against Secret Horizontal Agreements in the EC Competition Policy” in B. HAWK (ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, Fordham Corporate Law. Juris Publishing, 2003, 85-103;

 

  • HARDING, C. and JOSHUA, J., Regulating Cartels in Europe. A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 409p.;

 

  • HASLETT, D.W., Moral Rightness, The Hague, Nijnoff, 1974, 192p.;

 

  • HETZEL, J., Kronzeugenregelingen im Kartellrecht – Anwendung und Ausleging von Vorschiften über den Erlass von Geldbußen im lichte elementarer Rechtsgrundsätze, Berlin, Nomos, 2004, 354p.;

 

  • HOWARD, A., ROSE, V. and ROTH, P., “The Enforcement of the Competition Rules in the Member States” in P. ROTH and V. ROSE (eds.), Bellamy & Child. European Community Law of Competition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 1150-1178;

 

  • JONES, A. and SUFRIN, B., EC Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, 2011, 1418p.;

 

  • JOSHUA, J.M., “The Powers of the Commission: Efficiency and Swiftness in Investigative Procedures” in X (ed.), Rights of Defence and Rights of the European Commission in EC Competition Law, Brussels, Bruylant, 1994, 9-37;

 

  • JOWELL, J., “The Rule of Law and its Underlying Values”, in J. JOWELL and D. OLIVER (eds.), The Changing Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 5-25;

 

  • JOWELL, J., “Administrative Justice and Standards of Substantial Review”, in A. ARNULL, P. EECKHOUT and T. TRIDIMAS (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law, Essays in Honor of Sir Francis Jacobs, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 172-186;

 

  • KERSE, C.S., “General Principles of Community Law: Procedural Guarantees – A Note”, in U. BERNITZ and J. NERGELIUS (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports From a Conference in Malmö, 27-28 August 1999, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 205-217;

 

  • KERSE, C.S. and KHAN, N., EC Antitrust Procedure, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005, 686p.;

 

  • LANG, J.T., “Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectations as General Principles of law”, in U. BERNITZ and J. NERGELIUS (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmö, 27-28 August 1999, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 161-185;

 

  • LEMMENS, P., “Enkele beschouwingen bij de zogenaamde “volle rechtsmacht” van de rechter bij de toetsing van administratieve sancties”, in D. D’HOOGHE, K. DEKETELAERE and A.M. DRAYE (eds.) Liber Amicorum Marc Boes, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 393-411;

 

  • LENAERTS, K. and CAMBIEN, N., “The Democratic Legitimacy of The EU After the Treaty of Lisbon”, in J. WOUTERS, L. VERHEY and P. KIIVER (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009, 185-207;

 

  • LENAERTS, K. and VAN NUFFEL, P., European Union law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2011, 1083p.;

 

  • LINDGREN, K.-O. and PERSSON, T., “Input and Output Legitimacy: Synergy or Trade-Off? Empirical Evidence from an EU Survey”, Journal of European Public Policy 2010, 449-467;

 

  • LOVETT, F., A General Theory of Domination and Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 288p.;

 

  • MARENCO, G., “The Birth of Modern Competition Law in Europe”, in A. VON BOGDANDY, P.C. MAVROIDIS and Y. MENY (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination – Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 279-295;

 

  • MEROLA, M. and WAELBROECK, D., Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe. Time for a Review of Regulation 1/2003?, Brussels, Bruylant, 2010, 501p.;

 

  • MONNET, A. and MARENCO, G., “The Birth of Modern Competition Law in Europe”, in A. VON BOGDANDY, PC MAVROIDIS and Y. MENY (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination – Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 279-289;

 

  • MONTI, G., EC Competition Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 527p.;

 

  • ORTEGA, L., “Fundamental rights in the European Constitution”, European Public Law. Kluwer Law International 2005, 363-373;

 

  • PAULIS, E., “Eighteen Months of Cooperation Within the ECN- Achievements and Challenges Illustrated the Work in the Leniency Field”, in A.M. MATEUS and T. MOREIRA (eds.), Competition Law and Economics. Advances in Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007, 61-83;

 

  • RITTER, L. and BRAUN, W.D., European Competition Law: a Practitioner’s Guide, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004, 1226p.;

 

  • ROSE, V. and BAILEY, D., Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of Competition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 1627p.;

 

  • ROSS, D.W., The Right and the Good, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002, 183p.;

 

  • SALOMON, M.E, TOSTENSEN, A. and VANDENHOLE, W, Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty Bearers, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, 462p.;

 

  • SCHEMERS, H.G., “Human Rights as General Principles of Law”, in U. BERNITZ and J. NERGELIUS (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 61-73;

 

  • SCHROEDER, D. and HEIND, S., “Requests for Leniency in the EU: Experience and Legal Puzzles” in K. CSERES, M. SCHINKER and F. VOGELAAR (eds.), Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2006, 161-175;

 

  • SCHWARZE, J. and WEITBRECHT, A., Grundzuge des Europaïschen Kartellverfahrensrechts, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004, 416p.;

 

  • SCHWARZE, J., European Administrative Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, 1562p.;

 

 

  • SULLIVAN, A. and SHEFFRIN, S.M., Economics: Principles in Action, New Jersey, Upper Saddle River, 2003, 592p.;

 

  • TARUFFO, M., Abuse of Procedural Rights. Comparative Standards of Procedural Fairness, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, 370p.;

 

  • TIMBERG, S., “Report on the United States”, in W.G. FRIEDMANN (ed.), Antitrust Laws: A Comparative Symposium, London, Stevens, 1956, 635p.;

 

  • TRIDIMAS, T., “The General Principles of EU Law”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 591p.;

 

  • USHER, J., General Principles of EC Law, London, Longman, 1998, 167p.; 

 

  • VAN BAEL, I. and BELLIS, J.-F., Competition Law of the European Community, Alphen aan den Rijn, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010, 1674p.;

 

  • VAN GERVEN, W., The European Union. A Polity of States and Peoples, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2005, 397p.;

 

  • VAN KEMPEN, P. H., “The Recognition of Legal Persons in International Human Rights Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice”, in M. PIETH and R. IVORY (eds.), Corporate Criminal Liability. Emergence, Convergence and Risk. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, New York, Springer, 2011, 355-389;

 

  • VAN NUFFEL, P., "De handhaving van het Europees mededingingsrecht in het licht van de mensenrechten" in X (ed.), Recht in beweging, 19de VRG-alumnidag 2012, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 353-364;

 

  • VERVAELE, J., “Multilevel and Multiple Punishment in Europe. The ne bis in idem Principle and the Protection of Human Rights in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in A. VAN HOEK and T. HOL (eds.), Multilevel Governance in Enforcement and Adjudication in, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006, 1-24;

 

  • WAELBROECK, D. and SMITS, C., “Le droit de la concurrence et les droits fondamentaux” in M.C. SOLIANA (ed.), Les droits de l’homme dans les politiques de l’Union européenne, Brussel, Larcier, 2006, 137-156; 

 

  • WALKER, N., “The Rule of Law and the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Virtue”, in G. PALOMBELLA and N. WALKER (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009, 138-156; 

 

  • WHISH, R. and BAILEY, D., Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 1015p.;

 

  • WILS, W., “The Reform of Competition Law Enforcement – Will it Work?, Community Report for the FIDE XXI Congress, Dublin, 2-5 June 2004” in D. CAHELL (ed.), The Modernization of EU Competition Law Enforcement in the EU – FIDE 2004 National Reports, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 661-676; 

 

  • WILS, W., Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005, 187p.;

 

  • WILS, W., “Leniency: Theory and Practice”, in Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Oxford Hart Publishing, 2008, 113-155;

 

 

  • WYATT, D. and DASHWOOD, A., Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011, 985p.;

 

 

 

B. Journals

 

 

  • ACOCELLA, C.,“Droit Punitif et Valeur de la certitude. Le cas de la clémence dans le cadre du droit de la concurrence”, Revue de Droit international et de Droit Comparé 2013, 7-36;

 

  • ALLAIN, M.L, BOYER, M., KOTCHONI, R. and PONSSARD, J.-P., “The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases. The Myth of Under-Deterrence”, Scientific Series 2011, 1-34, available at www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2011s-34.pdf;

 

  • AMEYE, E.M., “The Interplay Between Human Rights and Competition Law in the EU”, ECLR 2004, 332-341;

 

  • ANDERSON, D. and CUFF, R., “Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness for Defendants and Claimants”, Fordham International Law Journal 2011, 398-392;

 

  • ANDREANGELI, A., “Between Economic Freedom and Effective Competition Enforcement: the Impact of the Antitrust Remedies Provided by the Modernisation Regulation on Investigated Parties’ Freedom to Contract and to Enjoy Property”, Comp. L. Rev. 2010, 226-257; 

 

  • ARTS, D. and BOURGEOIS, K., “Samenwerking tussen mededingingsautoriteiten en rechtsbescherming: enkele bedenkingen”, TBM 2006, 1-47;

 

  • ARTS, D., “Iedereen gelijk voor de wet? Beschouwingen over de rechtmatigheid van het verlenen van clementie in kartelzaken”, TBM 2012, 3-18;

 

  • BALL, H.V. and FRIEDMAN, L.M., “The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View”, Stanford Law Review 1965, 197-214;

 

 

  • BECKER, G.S., “Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach”, Journal of Political Economy 1968, 169-217; 

 

  • BENJAMIN, V.O., “The Application of EC Competition Law and the European Convention on Human Rights”, ECLR 2006, 693-699;

 

  • BENNETT, M. and COLLINS, P., “The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, European Competition Journal 2010, 311-337;

 

  • BERNHARD, M. and KARAKOC, E., “Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship”, World Politics 2007, 539-567;

 

  • BEUMER, A.E. and KARPETAS, A., “The Disclosure of Files and Documents in EU Cartel Cases: Fairytale or Reality?”, European Competition Journal 2012, 123-151;

 

  • BILLIET, P., “How Lenient is the EC Leniency Policy? A Matter of Certainty and Predictability”, ECLR 2009, 14-21;

 

  • BISHOP, J.D., “The Limits of Corporate Rights and the Rights of For-Profit Organizations”, Business Ethics Quaterly 2012, 119-144;

 

  • BLAKE, S. and SCHNICHELS, D., “Leniency Following Modernization: Safeguarding Europe’s Leniency Programs”, Competition Policy Newsletter, 7-13;

 

  • BOOT, J., “Privaatrecht & Boete. Over double damages bij privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededinging”, Ars Aequi 2008, 200-208;

 

  • BOTTEMAN, Y. and HUGHES, P., “Access To File: Striking the Balance Between Leniency and Private Enforcement Tools”, The European Antitrust Review 2013, 3-8;

 

  • BRENNER, S., “An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 2009, 639-645;

 

  • BROKX, L., “A Patchwork of Leniency Programs”, ECLR 2001, 35-46;

 

  • BRONCKERS, M. and VALLERY, A., “No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU Competition Law”, World Competition 2011, 535-570; 

 

  • BRONCKERS, M. and VALLERY, A., “Business as Usual After Menarini?”, mLex Magazine 2012, 44-52;

 

  • BRONCKERS, M. and VALLERY, A., “Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for Authorities and Which Role for the Courts after Menarini?”, European Competition Journal 2012, 283-292;

 

  • BRYANT P. and ECKARD, E., “Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 1991, 531-536; 

 

  • BULL, R., “Klusmann Calls for Review of EU Marker System”, Global Competition Review 2010, 1-2;

 

  • BUREZ, H. and WIJCKMANS, F., “Het onderzoek à décharge  - food for thought”, TBM 2012, 184-188;

 

  • BURNSIDE, A. and CROSSLEY, H.,  “Co-operation in Competition: A New Era?” Eur. Law Rev. 2005, 234-260;

 

  • CALLEWAERT, J., “The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law: A Long Way to Harmony”, EHRLR 2009, 770-773;

 

  • CANENBLEY, C. and STEINVORTH, T., “Effective Enforcement of Competition Law: Is There a Solution to the Conflict Between Leniency Programs and Private Damages Actions?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2011, 315-326;

 

  • CAPOBIANCO, A., “Information Exchange Under EC Competition Law”, CMLR 2004, 1247-1276;

 

  • CARMELIET, T., “How Lenient is the European Leniency System? An Overview of Current (Dis)incentives to Blow the Whistle”, Jura Falc. 2011-2012, 463-512;

 

  • CASSINELLI, C.W., “Totalitarianism, Ideology and Propaganda”, The Journal Of Politics 1960, 68-95;

 

  • CAUFMANN, C., “Access to Leniency-Related Documents after Pfleiderer”, World Competition 2011, 611-629;

 

 

  • CENGIZ, F., “Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the EU Competition Law Regime after ALROSA”, European Competition Journal 2011, 127-153;

 

  • COFFEE, J., “Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models – And What Can Be Done About It”, The Yale Law Journal Company 1992, 1875-1893;

 

  • DEKEYSER, K. and JASPERS, M., “A new era of ECN Cooperation. Achievements and challenges with special focus on work in the leniency field”, World Competition 2007, 3-24;

 

  • DE STEFANO, G., “Access of Damage Claimants to Evidence Arising Out of EU Cartel Investigations: A Fast-Evolving Scenario”, GCLR 2012, 95-110;

 

  • EDITORIAL COMMENTS, “Towards a More Judicial Approach? EU Antitrust Fines Under the Scrutiny of Fundamental Rights”, CMLR 2011, 1405-1416;

 

  • FLATTERY, J., “Balancing Efficiency and Justice in EU Competition Law: Elements of Procedural Fairness and Their Impact on the Right to a Fair Trial”, Comp. L. Rev. 2010, 53-81;

 

  • FORRESTER, I., “Due Process in EC Competition Cases: a Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures”, Eur. Law Rev. 2009, 817-843;

 

  • FORT, P.W., “Access to Evidence – The Conflict Between Leniency and Private Antitrust Legislation”, GCLR 2008, 25-34;

 

  • GALLIGAN, D., “The Nature and Functions of Policies within Discretionary Power”, Public Law 1976, 332-356;

 

  • GAUER, C. and JASPERS, M., “Designing a European Solution for a “One-Stop Leniency Shop”, ECLR 2006, 685-692;

 

  • GERADIN, D. and HENRY, D. “The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts’ Judgments”, The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series, GCLC Working Paper 03/05 2005, 59p., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=671794;

 

  • GERBER, D.J.,  “Private enforcement of competition law: a comparative perspective” in The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 431-452;

 

  • GODDIN, G., “The Pfleiderer Judgment on Transparency: the National Sequel of the Access to Document Saga”, Journal of European Competition law & Practice 2012, 40-42;

 

 

  • GRAFSTEIN, R., “The Legitimacy of Political Institutions”, Palgrave MacMillan Journals 1981, 51-67;

 

 

  • GUERSENT, O., “The EU Model of Administrative Enforcement Against Global Cartels: Evolving to Meet Challenges,” in C.-D. EHLERMANN and I. ATANASIU (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006, 214-216;

 

 

 

  • HEMPEL, R., “Access to DG Competition’s Files: An Analysis of Recent EU Court Case Law”, ECLR 2012, 195-210;

 

  • HOFMANN, H., “Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality”, ELJ 2009, 482-505;

 

  • HUNT, S.D. and DUHAN, D.F., “Competition in The Third Millennium. Efficiency or Effectiveness?, Journal of Business Research 2002, 97-102;

 

  • JAEGER, M., “The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalization of the Marginal Review?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2011, 295-310;

 

  • JONES, C.A., “Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check” World Competition 2004, 13-24;

 

  • JOSHUA, J. and CAMESASCA, P., “The Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice: High Noon for Reform”, Global Competition Review 2007, 1-5;

 

  • KATYAL, N.K., “Conspiracy Theory”, Yale Law Journal 2003, 101-182;

 

 

  • KNOX, R., “ICN- The Due Process Debate Continues”, Global Competition Review 2012, 21-26;

 

 

  • KONOVSKU, M.A., “Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations”, Journal of Management 2000, 489-511;

 

  • KUNEVA, M., “Competition Policy and Consumer Protection in the EU”, 25-27;

 

  • KUNZLIK, P.F., “Globalization and Hybridization in Antitrust Enforcement: European “Borrowings From the U.S. Approach”, Summer 2003, The Antitrust Bulletin, 319-353;

 

  • LEBECK, C., “Procedural Fairness as Constitutional Justice: An Essay on Hans Kelsen’s Theory of Liberal Constitutionalism”, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 2008, 559-612;

 

  • LENAERTS, K., “L’Egalité de traitement en droit communautaire: un principe unique aux apparences multiples”, CDE 1991, 3-41;

 

  • LENAERTS, K. and VANHAMME, J., “Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process”, CMLR 1997, 531-569;

 

 

  • LEVEQUE, F., “L’Efficacité multiforme des programmes de clémence”, Concurrences 2004, 31-38;

 

  • LEVY, N. and O’DONOGHUE, R., “The EU Leniency Program Comes of Age”, World Competition 2004, 75-99;

 

  • LOUIS, F. and. ACCARDO, G., “Ne bis in Idem, Part ‘bis’”, World Competition 2011, 97-112;

 

  • LOWE, P., “The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century – The Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2008, 1-11;

 

  • MACCULLOCH, A., “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, in Competition Investigations: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Implications”, Legal Studies 2006, 211-237;

 

  • MESSINA, M., “The Protection of the Right to Private Life, Home and Correspondence v the Efficient Enforcement of Competition Law: Is a New EC Competition Court the Right Way Forward?”, European Competition Journal 2007, 185-214;

 

  • MONTAG, F., “The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17”, ECLR 1996, 428-467;

 

  • NASH, J.F., “Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games”, Proceedings of the National Academics of Science 1950, 48-49;

 

  • NOURRY, A. and JEPHCOTT, M., “The Interaction of EC and National Leniency Systems. Closing the Gap Between the Two Regimes is Critical”, Competition Law Insight 2005, 7-15;

 

  • OLIVER, P., “’Diagnostics’ – A Judgment Applying the Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Competition”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2012, 163-165;

 

 

  • PARRET, L., “Effectieve rechtsbescherming: eindeloos potentieel, ongeleid projectiel?” NtER 2012, 159-169;

 

 

  • PECH, L., “The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/09 2009, 1-81, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463242;

 

  • PONCE, J., “Good Administration and Administrative Procedures”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 2005, 551-588;

 

  • POWER, V.J., “The Relative Merits of Courts and Agencies in Competition Law – Institutional Design: Administrative Models; Judicial Models; and Mixed Models”, European Competition Journal 2010, 91-127;

 

  • RATNER, S.R., “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility”, The Yale Law Journal 2001, 443-545;

 

  • REYNOLDS, M. and ANDERSON, D., “Immunity and Leniency in EU Cartel Cases: Current Issues”, ECLR 2006, 82-90;

 

  • RIJNSBERGEN, F., “De clementieregeling: boetevermindering door samen te werken met de Commissie”, SEW 1998, 202-204;

 

  • RILEY, A., “The Modernization of EU Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?”, ECLR 2010, 191-207;

 

  • RILEY, A., “Cartel Whistleblowing: Toward an American Model?”, CMLR 2002, 1-38;

 

  • RILEY, A.,  “Beyond Leniency: Enhancing Enforcement in EC Antitrust Law”, World Competition 2005, 377-400;

 

  • ROSENFELD, M., “The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy”, Southern Californian Law Review 2001, 1307-1352;

 

  • RUGGEBERG, J. and. SCHINKEL, M.P, “Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europe: A Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement”, Amsterdam Centre of Law & Economics 2006, 1-17, available at http://ssrn.com/paper=903282;

 

  • SANDHU, J.S., “The European Commission’s Leniency Policy: A Success?”, ECLR 2007, 148-157;

 

  • SCHOORS, T., BAEYENS, T. and DEVROE, W., “Schadevergoedingsacties na kartelinbreuken”, NjW 2011, 198-213; 

 

  • SCHROTER, H.G., “Cartelization and Decartelization in Europe, 1870-1995: Rise and Decline of an Economic Institution” Journal of European Economic History 1996, 129-153;

 

  • SCHWAB, A. and STEINLE, C., “Pitfalls of the European Competition Network – Why Better Protection of Leniency Applicants and Legal Regulation of Case Allocation is Needed”, ECLR 2008, 523-532;

 

  • SCHWARZE, J., “Les sanctions imposes pour les infractions au droit Européen de la concurrence selon l’article 23 du règlement n°1/2003 CE à la lumière des principes généraux du droit”, RTD Eur. 2007, 1-24;

 

  • SCHWARZE, J., BECHTOLD, R. and BOSCH, W., “Deficiencies in European Community Competition Law. Critical Analysis of the Current Practice and Proposals for Change”, Gleiss Lutz Rechtsanwälte 2008, 1-85;

 

  • SCHWARZE, J., “Soft law im Recht der Europäischen Union”, Zeitschrift Europarecht 2011, 3-18;

 

  • SEN, A., “Markets and Freedom: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms”, Oxford Economic Papers, 519-543;

 

  • SIBONY, A.L. and BARBIER DE LA SERRE, E., “Charge de la preuve et théorie du controle en droit communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective”, Revue trimestrielle Droit Europeen  2007, 205-252;

 

  • STEENBERGEN, J., “Private enforcement. Bedenkingen na de Competition Day”, TBM 2011, 33-36;

 

  • STILLMAN, P.G., “The Concept of Legitimacy”, Palgrave Macmillan Journals 1974, 32-56;

 

 

  • SUURNAKKI, S. and TIERNO CENTELLA, M.L., “European Commission Adopts Revised Leniency Notice to Reward Companies that Report Hard-Core Cartels”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2007, 7-15;

 

 

  • TIERNO CENTELLA, M.T., PINO, M. and KLOUB, J., “Cartel Fined in the Gas Insulated Switchgear Sector”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2007, 43-44; 

 

  • VAN BAEL, I., “Fining à la carte: The Lottery of EU Competition Law”, ECLR 1999, 237-243;

 

  • VAN BARLINGEN, B. and BARENNES, M., “The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice In Practice”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2005, 6-16;

 

  • VAN BARLINGEN, L., “The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice After One Year of Operation”, Antitrust, 2003, 1-87;

 

  • VAN CLEYNENBREUGEL, P., “Case law. Case note. Constitutionalizing Comprehensively Tailored Judicial Review in EU Competition Law. Judgments of the Court (second chamber) in Case C-272/09, KME Germany, KME France SAS and KME Italy spa v European Commission, Case C-386/1, Chalkor ae Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission and Case C-389/10, KME Germany, KME France SAS and KME Italy spa v European Commission of 8 December 2011, nyr”, Columbia Journal of European Law 2012, 519-544;

 

  • VANDENBORRE, I. and THOMAS, S.B., “European Court of Justice Provides Limited Guidance on the Disclosure of Leniency Documents”, ECLR 2011, 488-489;

 

  • VAN GERVEN, W., “Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules Before National Courts”, European Competition Law Annual 2001, 1-37;

 

  • VAN KEMPEN, P.H.P.,  “Human Rights and Criminal Justice Applied to Legal Persons. Protection and Liability of Private and Public Juristic Entities Under the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR, AfChHPR”, European Journal of Comparative Law 2010, 1-34;

 

  • VERMA, P. and BILLIET, P., “Why Would Cartel Participants Still Refuse to Blow the Whistle under the Current EC Leniency Policy?”, Global Antitrust Review 2009, 1-20;

 

  • VESTERDORF, B., “The Court of Justice and Unlimited Jurisdiction: What Does it mean In Practice?” Global Competition Policy 2009, 1603-1634;

 

  • WAELBROECK, D. and FOSSELARD, D., “Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be Left to an Independent Judge?  The Impact of the European Convention of Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures”, Yearbook of European Law 1994, 111- 142;

 

  • WALSH, D. J., “Carrots and Sticks – Leniency and Fines in EC Cartel Cases”, ECLR 2009, 30-35;

 

  • WARLOUZET, L. and WITSCHKE, T., “The Difficult Path to an Economic Rule of Law: European Competition Policy 1950-91”, Contemporary European History 2012, 437-455;

 

  • WECK, T., “Antitrust Infringements in the Distribution Chain- When is Leniency Available to Suppliers?”, ECLR 2010, 394-401;

 

  • WEISS, W., “After Lisbon, Can the European Commission Continue to Rely on ‘Soft Legislation’ in its Enforcement Practice?”, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 2011, 441-451;

 

  • WEISS, W., “Human Rights and EU Antitrust Enforcement: News from Lisbon”, ECLR 2011, 186-195:

 

  • WEISS, W., “Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights After Lisbon”, European Constitutional Law Review 2011, 64-95;

 

  • WESSELING, R. and VAN DER WOUDE, M.H., “Over de rechtmatigheid en aanvaardbaarheid van de handhaving van het Europese kartelrecht”, SEW 2012, 174-186;

 

  • WIJCKMANS, F. and TUYTSCHAEVER, F., “Tot zover het Belgisch kartelparadijs”, RW 2008, 1178-1196;

 

  • WILLIS, P.R., “You have the right to remain silent…”, or do you? The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Following Mannesmannröhren-Werke and Other Recent Decisions”, ECLR 2001, 313-321;

 

  • WILS, W., “La comptabilité des procedures communautaires en matière de concurrence avec la convention Européenne des droits de l’homme”, World Competition 1996, 329-354;

 

  • WILS, W., “The Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases: a Legal and Economic Analysis”, Eur. Law Rev. 1997, 125-140;

 

  • WILS, W., “Self-Incrimination in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, World Competition 2003, 567-588;

 

  • WILS, W., “The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: a Legal and Economic Analysis”, World Competition 2004, 201-224;

 

  • WILS, W., “Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?”, World Competition 2005, 117-159;  

 

  • WILS, W., “Powers of Investigation and Procedural Rights and Guarantees in EU Antitrust Enforcement”, World Competition 2006, 3-30;

 

  • WILS, W.,  “The European Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines: a Legal and Economic Analysis”, World Competition 2007, 197-229; 

 

  • WILS, W., “Leniency in Antitrust enforcement: Theory and Practice”, World Competition 2007, 25-64;

 

  • WILS, W.,  “The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the ECHR”, World Competition 2010, 5-29;

 

  • WILSHER, D.,  “The Public Aspects of Private Enforcement in EC Law: Some Constitutional and Administrative Challenges of a Damages Culture”, Comp. L. Rev. 2006, 27-45;

 

 

  • ZIMMER, D., “On Fairness and Welfare: The Objectives of Competition Policy” European Competition Annual 2007, 1-5;

 

  • ZINGALES, N., “European and American Leniency Programs: Two Models Towards Convergence?”, Comp. L. Rev. 2008, 5-60.

 

 

 

C. Miscellany (reports – speeches – websites)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • Former Commissioner N. KROES, “Answer to Parliamentary Question from Sharon Bowles MEP, Written questions: E-0890/09, E-0891/09, E-0892/09” [2009] April 2, 2009;

 

 

 

 

Universiteit of Hogeschool
Master of Laws in de rechten
(momenteel Master of Arts opleiding aan John's Hopkins University) in de VSA
Publicatiejaar
2013
Kernwoorden
Share this on: